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IT’S TIME FOR AN INTERVENTION!:
RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RULE
24(a)(2) AND ARTICLE III STANDING
Gregory R. Manring*
Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides an
important apparatus by which a nonparty to a dispute may enter by her own
initiative to protect an unrepresented interest. Despite the utility and
function in balancing the interests of private parties and the effects that
their disputes have on third parties, especially in the public law realm,
intervention’s requirements are unclear. Whether intervenors of right must
independently satisfy Article III standing requirements or whether Article
III is satisfied by the existence of a case or controversy between the original
parties remains unresolved. The courts of appeals are currently split on the
issue—seven do not require Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors to show standing and
three do. These categorical approaches, however, are both functionally
and legally inadequate.
This Note argues that federal courts should employ an approach that is
more related to maintaining the benefits of Rule 24 without running afoul of
Article III—a task the yes-or-no approach is ill equipped to handle.
Ultimately, an approach that is based on employing a standing analysis
only where the Case or Controversy Clause is implicated anew allows the
greatest access to the intervention device without running the risk of
entertaining nonjusticiable disputes.
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INTRODUCTION
Article III of the U.S. Constitution created and vested the power to
resolve certain cases and controversies in the federal judiciary.1 A federal
court’s power to entertain a dispute turns on whether a party has standing to
assert that claim—that is, whether a party alleges that she has suffered an
actual, redressable injury that is traceable to the alleged conduct.2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) (“the Rule”) defines the
circumstances under which a nonparty to a dispute has the right to enter the
dispute to protect an interest in the outcome.3 An affected party has the
right to intervene when she alleges impairment of an interest and a lack of
existing adequate representation for that interest.4
However, whether such intervention constitutes a new case or
controversy—subject to a separate standing analysis—remains unresolved.5
This Note seeks to balance constitutional and statutory requirements with
judicial efficiency concerns and public interest and policy considerations
that influence when a separate standing analysis is appropriate for Rule
24(a)(2) motions.6
Accordingly, Part I of this Note examines the requirements and purpose
of Rule 24(a)(2) intervention and the Case or Controversy Clause. It also
discusses different types of intervenors and their relationship with the
intervention of right and Article III standing requirements. Part II discusses
the U.S. Supreme Court’s lack of guidance on the subject and the opposing
views of the federal circuits that have filled this void. Finally, Part III
proposes a resolution to this problem. A categorical approach to whether
Article III standing is required for Rule 24(a)(2) intervention fails to serve
the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Case or
Controversy Clause. Because intervention itself does not trigger the Case
or Controversy Clause’s jurisdictional constraints, federal courts should
adopt a more nuanced inquiry to determine whether a standing analysis is
truly necessary.
I. THE CASE OR CONTROVERSY CLAUSE
AND INTERVENTION OF RIGHT
The discordant relationship between the Case or Controversy Clause and
Rule 24 intervention of right is long standing and unsettled.7 Each doctrine
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); see also infra Part I.A.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); see also infra Part I.A.2.
5. See, e.g., Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2016)
(noting that “a circuit split on this issue has persisted for some time”), cert. granted, 137 S.
Ct. 810 (2017); see also infra Part II.
6. See infra Parts II–III.
7. The Rule 24 amendment and expansion in 1966 spawned this circuit split. See infra
note 21. Federal courts have not uniformly resolved the issue of intervenor standing over the
subsequent five decades. See infra Part II.
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alone is the subject of extensive scholarly and judicial interpretation.8 At
the intersection of these two doctrines lies a grey area of grey areas. Must
intervenors of right independently satisfy Article III’s jurisdictional
limitations? What are the purposes of these doctrines, and does requiring or
forgoing a standing analysis better serve them? To provide context for
answering these questions, Part I.A provides an overview of the history and
requirements of intervention of right. Next, Part I.B explains Article III
standing’s demands and purpose. Part I.C then discusses the different types
of intervenors and their relationship with these two doctrines.
A. Rule 24(a)(2) Intervention of Right
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the mechanism
by which a nonparty to litigation may join in a suit.9 Intervention may be
“permissive”—a court may choose to allow it10—or “of right”—a court
must allow it.11 Permissive intervention is possible where a statute gives a
conditional right12 or where the would-be intervenor “has a claim or
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or
fact.”13 Intervention is a right in two instances: where a federal statute
gives such a right14 and where the would-be intervenor “claims an
interest . . . and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.”15 The latter is the
primary focus of this Note. To better conceptualize the tension between the
Case or Controversy Clause and Rule 24, Part I.A.1 discusses the history
and purpose of intervention, Part I.A.2 turns to the specific requirements for
intervention of right, and Part I.A.3 explains the rights of intervenors.

8. See infra Part I.A–B.
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
10. See id. 24(b).
11. See id. 24(a).
12. Id. 24(b)(1)(A).
13. Id. 24(b)(1)(B). Intervention is also permissive where a government agency or
official seeks to intervene where one of the party’s claims is based on a statute, executive
order, regulation, or a requirement or agreement administered by the officer or agency. Id.
24(b)(2).
14. Id. 24(a)(1). Whether standing is necessary to intervene is an important
consideration for whether Congress may be prohibited from creating a statutory right to
intervene in some instances due to the limitations on Congress’s ability to confer a right of
action. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566–67 (1992).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); see also Purcell v. BankAtlantic Fin. Corp., 85 F.3d 1508,
1512 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that an intervenor of right must establish timeliness in addition
to interest, impairment, and inadequate representation). But see Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d
745, 753 (5th Cir. 2005) (asserting that intervention should be allowed where “no one would
be hurt and greater justice could be attained” (quoting Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202,
1205 (5th Cir. 1994))).
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1. What Is Intervention?
Intervention is a relatively new phenomenon in American procedure.16
However, its use and availability have greatly expanded over the last
century.17 Rule 24’s predecessor, Equity Rule 37, was adopted in 1912 and
provided that “[a]nyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at any
time be permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention
shall be in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of the main
proceeding.”18 The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gave
intervention an even greater role in federal litigation.19
Since the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24 has
been amended several times.20 The most recent change to Rule 24(a)
occurred in 1966 when the text was modified to make intervention of right
less restrictive.21 Before this change, a party had to show that she might be
bound by the resulting judgment22 or that she may be “adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property.”23 The new Rule
incorporated both of these ideas and expanded the requisite effect to
encompass impaired interests that were not adequately represented.24 Thus,
the modern Rule 24 allows a nonparty to a dispute to intervene to protect an
interest that is unrepresented by the existing parties.25

16. See 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1901 (3d ed. 2007) (discussing the historical background of
intervention).
17. See id.; see also James Wm. Moore & Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention I. The
Right to Intervene and Reorganization, 45 YALE L.J. 565 (1936).
18. FED. EQUITY R. 37 (1912) (repealed 1938).
19. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1901; see also Cascade Nat. Gas
Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133 (1967) (“Rule 24(a)(3) was not merely a
restatement of existing federal practice at law and in equity.”).
20. See Tyler R. Stradling & Doyle S. Byers, Intervening in the Case (or Controversy):
Article III Standing, Rule 24 Intervention, and the Conflict in the Federal Courts, 2003 BYU
L. REV. 419, 423. For a brief discussion on how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
amended, see id. at 423–24.
21. See id. at 423; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24 advisory committee’s note to 1966
amendment (“The general purpose of original Rule 24(a)(2) was to entitle an absentee,
purportedly represented by a party, to intervene in the action if he could establish with fair
probability that the representation was inadequate. Thus, where an action is being
prosecuted or defended by a trustee, a beneficiary of the trust should have a right to
intervene if he can show that the trustee’s representation of his interest probably is
inadequate; similarly a member of a class should have the right to intervene in a class action
if he can show the inadequacy of the representation of his interest by the representative
parties before the court.”).
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (1963) (amended 1966).
23. Id. 24(a)(3). Before 1966, however, the property provision was not subject to an
adequate representation caveat. See id.
24. See id. 24(a)(2).
25. See id.
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Although the Rule’s purpose remained substantially the same, the
loosening of the interest requirement led to divergence among the circuits
regarding what interests are sufficient to merit intervention of right.26
2. Intervention of Right Requirements
To intervene under Rule 24(a)(2), a proposed intervenor must
demonstrate an interest that is impaired and not adequately represented by
the existing parties.27 This interest must be specific and should represent a
“significantly protectable interest.”28
The Supreme Court has ruled twice on the sufficiency of an interest for
the purposes of Rule 24(a)(2). The Court decided Cascade Natural Gas
Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.29 in 1967, the year after the Rule 24(a)
amendment.30 In El Paso, the Court allowed Cascade Natural Gas Corp.,
the State of California, and Southern California Edison to intervene in a
natural gas antitrust suit to protect their interests in a competitive system.31
Four years later, in Donaldson v. United States,32 the Court ruled that the
proposed intervenor’s interest in obtaining records did not afford him a
right to intervene in an IRS enforcement proceeding under Rule 24.33
With such limited guidance, what constitutes a protectable interest varies
substantially among the circuits. Some circuits interpret the interest
requirement as a lenient standard.34 Others construe the standard more
narrowly,35 even tying it to the more onerous Article III standing
requirement.36 Generally, as in the previous iteration of Rule 24, a party
may intervene if she would be bound by the judgment in the litigation.37
Property interests, although sufficient in all circuits, are not necessary as
they were in the previous version of the Rule.38 However, whether a purely
26. See Juliet Johnson Karastelev, Note, On the Outside Seeking In: Must Intervenors
Demonstrate Standing to Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DUKE L.J. 455, 457 (2002); see also Carl
Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415, 432–36 (1991).
27. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
28. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (quoting Donaldson v. United States,
400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971)).
29. 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 135.
32. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
33. Id. at 531.
34. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[I]n this circuit we
subscribe to a ‘rather expansive notion of the interest sufficient to invoke intervention of
right.’” (quoting Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997))).
35. For example, recently in Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2015), the
Fifth Circuit delineated a particularly narrow construction of the interest requirement. The
court held that “the inquiry turns on whether the intervenor has a stake in the matter that
goes beyond a generalized preference that the case come out a certain way” and that “an
intervenor fails to show a sufficient interest when he seeks to intervene solely for
ideological, economic, or precedential reasons.” Id. at 657.
36. See, e.g., Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. v. Craddieth, 442 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir.
2006); see also infra Part II.C.1.
37. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., 619 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing that “use and enjoyment of the unique aesthetic environment of [a] wilderness
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economic interest constitutes a “significantly protectable interest” varies
among the federal circuits.39
A Rule 24(a)(2) movant must also show that her interest would be
impaired by the litigation.40 Like in the former version of the Rule, this
impairment may be that the party would be bound by the judgment.41
Unlike with the old Rule, however, a negative stare decisis effect42 or
another form of practical impairment may be sufficient to satisfy this
prong.43
Even if a proposed intervenor demonstrates the requisite impaired
interest, intervention of right will be improper where a party to the action
already adequately represents the interest.44 The bar to establishing lack of
adequate representation is relatively low.45 Showing that existing parties
hold different or adverse objectives is typically sufficient to meet this
burden.46 In rare cases, some courts will dismiss an intervenor as a party
when her interests become aligned with the original plaintiff over the course
of litigation.47

area” was a sufficient interest to intervene); San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d
1163, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that environmental organizations’ interest in the impact
of vehicular traffic was sufficient to intervene); Grutter, 188 F.3d at 398 (finding that
prospective students’ interest in protecting educational opportunities was sufficient to
intervene); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (“[T]he desire to
use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a
cognizable interest . . . .”); supra note 23 and accompanying text.
39. See Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 578 F.3d 569, 572 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that gas
companies that stood to lose business from a challenged state law had an interest on those
grounds alone); Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 295 F.3d 1111, 1115
(10th Cir. 2002) (“The threat of economic injury from the outcome of litigation undoubtedly
gives a petitioner the requisite [Rule 24(a)(2)] interest.”). But see Mountain Top Condo.
Ass’n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that a
“mere economic interest . . . is insufficient to support the right to intervene”); New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding that
“an economic interest alone is insufficient . . . for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2)”).
40. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
41. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1908.2, at 368.
42. See id. § 1908.2, at 369.
43. See id. § 1908.2, at 374 n.18 (identifying a broad range of sufficient practical
impairments such as environmental impact, access to information, and ability to conduct
business).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2).
45. See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) (“The
requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his interest
‘may be’ inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as
minimal.”).
46. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1909, at 440.
47. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights &
Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652
F.3d 607, 633 (6th Cir. 2011).
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3. Rights of Intervening Parties
Before the Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938, Equity Rule 37 gave intervenors a subordinated role.48 However,
in crafting Rule 24, this caveat to intervention was discarded.49
Today, Rule 24 is commonly understood as granting an intervening party
the same rights as the original party to the dispute.50 As such, she may take
unilateral action such as moving to dismiss without the consent of the
original party.51 Circuits that require intervenors to demonstrate an
independent basis for standing typically place intervenors on equal footing
with the original parties.52 However, the inherent equal rights of
intervenors in circuits that do not require standing seem to exist only to the
extent of the scope of the original case or controversy.53
More recently, the Supreme Court has made it clear that an intervenor
may not “step into the shoes of the original party” where she has not
demonstrated an independent basis for Article III standing.54 But, what
intervening party actions fall within and without the equal-footing
framework remains unresolved.55
B. The Case or Controversy Clause
and the Standing Requirement
The Case or Controversy Clause56 limits the disputes the federal
judiciary may adjudicate.57 For a dispute to rise to the level of a case or

48. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1920, at 608.
49. See id.; see also Daniel C. Hopkinson, The New Federal Rules of Procedure as
Compared with the Former Federal Equity Rules and the Wisconsin Code, 23 MARQ. L.
REV. 159, 170 (1939).
50. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1920, at 611–12.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
53. See, e.g., Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1969) (“The
whole tenor and frame work of the Rules of Civil Procedure preclude application of a
standard which strictly limits the intervenor to those defenses and counterclaims which the
original defendant could himself have interposed. Where there exists a sufficiently close
relationship between the claims and defenses of the intervenor and those of the original
defendant to permit adjudication of all claims in one forum and in one suit without
unnecessary delay—and to avoid as well the delay and waste of judicial resources attendant
upon requiring separate trials—the district court is without discretion to deny the intervenor
the opportunity to advance such claims.” (quoting Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1963))).
54. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016) (quoting Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997)).
55. See infra Part III.C.2.
56. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two
or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of
different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
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controversy, the party bringing it must have Article III standing.58 The
standing inquiry assesses “whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial
powers on his behalf.”59 Accordingly, Part I.B.1 discusses the history and
function of the Case or Controversy Clause, Part I.B.2 defines the
requirements to show jurisdictional standing, and Part I.B.3 concludes with
the circumstances in which courts typically require a party to show
standing.
1. The Purpose of the Case or Controversy Clause
and the Standing Requirement
The justiciability requirements imposed by the Case or Controversy
Clause have been extrapolated to include both prudential requirements, such
as the prohibition on third-party standing and the prohibition of generalized
grievances,60 and jurisdictional requirements:
[T]he judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to
“cases” and “controversies.” As is so often the situation in constitutional
adjudication, those two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath
their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very
heart of our constitutional form of government. Embodied in the words
“cases” and “controversies” are two complementary but somewhat
different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal
courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.
And in part those words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a
tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.61

To better understand when a standing analysis is appropriate, Part I.B.1.a
expands on standing as a protector of the separation of powers and Part
I.B.1.b considers how the standing requirement promotes judicial efficiency
and issue presentation.

different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.” (emphasis added)).
57. Id.; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“If a dispute
is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding
the law in the course of doing so.”).
58. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).
59. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962)).
60. Because prudential standing is not jurisdictional, it is generally accepted that it can
be forgone or eliminated by the Court or by Congress. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881,
885 (1983). For ease of exposition, this Note examines jurisdictional requirements that
cannot be waived.
61. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968).

2534

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

a. Standing as a Jurisdictional Baseline
Standing limits the power of the federal judiciary to infringe on the
powers of the other branches of government by permitting it to resolve
disputes only where an actual, not potential, controversy exists:
The legislative and executive departments of the Federal Government, no
less than the judicial department, have a duty to defend the Constitution.
That shared obligation is incompatible with the suggestion that federal
courts might wield an “unconditioned authority to determine the
constitutionality of legislative or executive acts.” For the federal courts to
decide questions of law arising outside of cases and controversies would
be inimical to the Constitution’s democratic character. And the resulting
conflict between the judicial and the political branches would not, “in the
long run, be beneficial to either.”62

If the federal judiciary had the power to interpret any statute regardless of
whether its violation or application actually injured someone, in effect it
would have the power to legislate.63 Similarly, the ability to issue advisory
opinions could infringe on the legislature’s ability to give meaning to laws
and the executive’s mandate to execute laws.64 Standing mitigates this
conflict by providing the judiciary the power to resolve a dispute only
where (1) a determination of the parties’ rights is necessary and (2) the
dispute can be resolved through the judicial process.65
b. Standing as a Facilitator of the Judicial Process
The standing requirement also promotes judicial efficiency.66
Historically, the federal judiciary’s role has been to resolve disputes
between individuals rather than to determine the merits of general,
unparticularized grievances.67 The standing requirement ensures that the
federal judiciary’s resources are spent on the most pressing, actual disputes
rather than the public’s claims at large.68
Similarly, the standing requirement ensures that parties who are best
suited to present and litigate an issue have their day in court.69 Because
federal courts do not select the suits brought before them, “the allowance of
public actions would produce uneven and sporadic review, the quality of
62. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 133 (2011) (first quoting
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 471 (1982); then quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188–89 (1974));
see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146–47 (2013).
63. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009).
64. See id.
65. See Winn, 563 U.S. at 133.
66. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 192 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing the
negative implications of allowing federal courts to resolve public interest tax suits).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013) (“[C]oncrete
adverseness . . . sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962))).
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which would be influenced by the resources and skill of the particular
plaintiff.”70 Accordingly, a plaintiff with standing is not only better suited
to represent the interests at stake but also aids courts in discerning
important legal issues and arguments.71
2. Jurisdictional Standing Requirements
Although standing jurisprudence is confused and ever changing,72 the
Supreme Court maintains a basic three-part framework for evaluating
standing: (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the alleged conduct and
(3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.73 Part II.B.1.a gives an
overview of the injury requirement, while Part II.B.1.b addresses the
causation and redressability requirements.
a. Injury
Two factors determine whether an injury is an “injury in fact” that
satisfies the standing requirement: particularization and concreteness.74
First, the injury must be particularized.75 This means that an injury must
not be shared by the public at large, although it need not be individual to the
party.76
Second, the injury must be concrete.77 Tangible injuries such as physical
harm more easily pass the concreteness test than intangible injuries.78
However, intangible injuries, such as being “deprived of the benefits of
interracial association arising from living in an integrated community free
The
of housing discrimination,”79 may nonetheless be concrete.80
concreteness of intangible injuries is informed by two factors: (1) “whether
an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or
American courts”81 and (2) whether Congress has designated such an
70. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 190–91 (Powell, J., concurring).
71. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
72. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 55 (7th ed. 2016) (“Both justices
and commentators have frequently identified standing as one of the most confused areas of
the law.”).
73. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
74. See generally Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
75. Id. at 1548 (“Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is not
sufficient.”); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 508 (1975) (finding that “[a]bsent the necessary allegations of demonstrable,
particularized injury, there can be no confidence of ‘a real need to exercise the power of
judicial review’” (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221–22
(1974))).
76. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
77. Id. at 1548–49.
78. See id. at 1549.
79. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 369 (1982).
80. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
81. Id. Spokeo made clear that not every statutory violation is a concrete injury. See id.
at 1549–50. Justice Alito gave the example of a consumer reporting agency filing to give
notice to a user of its information in violation of an act of Congress. See id. at 1550. If the
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intangible injury as legally cognizable.82 Even if a statutory violation
causes no harm, it nonetheless may constitute an injury in fact where the
violation presents a “material risk of harm.”83
b. Causation and Redressability
Causation and redressability are intertwined and often addressed
together.84 They are closely linked because causation itself helps federal
courts determine whether granting the plaintiff the requested relief will end
or remedy the alleged injury.85 A plaintiff must allege that “the asserted
injury was the consequence of the defendants’ actions, or that the
prospective relief will remove the harm.”86 A plaintiff must also allege that
injury is “fairly traceable to the defendants allegedly unlawful conduct.”87
Finally, she must allege that the injury is “likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.”88
3. Who Needs Standing?
Typically, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving
standing.89 Standing is treated as a question of subject matter jurisdiction90:
an action where the plaintiff lacks standing may be properly dismissed
pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion91 or by the court sua sponte.92 Courts
typically require a single plaintiff in a multiplaintiff action to demonstrate
standing.93
information were true, there would be no injury in fact to the user, and if some information
were inaccurate, such as a zip code, the injury would not necessarily rise to the level of
concreteness. Id.
82. Id. at 1549 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)).
83. Id. at 1550.
84. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.5, at 389 (3d ed. 2008).
85. See id. § 3531.6.
86. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975) (discussing the baseline requirements of
Article III standing).
87. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
88. Id.
89. See 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 84, § 3531.15, at 301.
90. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1986).
91. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
92. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (“[I]f the
record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect,
although the parties make no contention concerning it.” (quoting United States v. Corrick,
298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936))); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152
(1908).
93. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2
(2006) (“[T]he presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s caseor-controversy requirement.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 n.1 (2002)
(“Because we are likewise satisfied that [one plaintiff] has standing, we need not address
whether [the other] also has standing.”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431
n.19 (1998) (“Because both the City of New York and the health care appellees have
standing, we need not consider whether the appellee unions also have standing to sue.”). But
see FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 483–90 (1985)
(addressing the Democratic National Committee’s standing, although the coplaintiff FEC
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Still, there appear to be two important exceptions to this rule. First, a
court may be compelled to reexamine standing when a party who has not
demonstrated standing obtains different relief from a party who has.94
Second, a party must have standing to assert substantive legal theories that
would affect a court’s consideration of the merits.95
C. Different Types of Intervenors
Not all intervenors are created equal. Depending on the circuit, the bar
for intervention may vary and the intervenor’s ability to influence the
course of the suit may diverge. A third party may intervene as a defendant
or a plaintiff under Rule 24, and some courts evaluate private and public
law intervenors’ interests under different standards. A practical approach to
intervenor standing should address the confusing aspect of defendant
standing while allowing judicial discretion regarding what constitutes a
sufficient interest. To that end, Part I.C.1 describes the differences between
intervenor-plaintiffs and intervenor-defendants, and Part I.C.2 explores how
private law and public law intervenors differ.
1. Plaintiffs v. Defendants
The function of a standing analysis for defendants is not entirely clear.
Article III and Supreme Court jurisprudence both indicate that defendants
must have standing to satisfy Article III.96 But because once a plaintiff
demonstrates Article III justiciability the defendant’s standing follows, this
issue is rarely directly addressed. The unusual circumstances in which
courts examine defendant standing include “(1) in the trial court, when
nonparties seek to be heard through intervention, and (2) on appeal, when
parties against whom no relief was ordered seek to overturn the trial court’s
judgment.”97

had standing, because of the potential for interference with the FEC’s exclusive jurisdiction
to enforce the Presidential Campaign Fund Act); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333 (1977)
(dismissing some plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing while allowing others to proceed).
94. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 402 n.22
(1982) (refusing to reexamine Pennsylvania’s standing until it “obtains relief different from
that sought by plaintiffs whose standing has not been questioned”).
95. See Hoohuli v. Ariyoshi, 631 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 n.19 (D. Haw. 1986) (“This court,
however, does not have to rule on the standing of the [other plaintiffs] unless . . . their claims
would materially affect this court’s consideration of the merits. For example, only if they
claimed different relief or different substantive theories would their status as additional
plaintiffs in this suit be important.” (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp.,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 n.16 (1978))). But see Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 833 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding that a jurisdictional issue does not arise when a party whose standing is
unexamined asserts different grounds for granting the same relief requested by the party with
standing).
96. See Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1550 (2012); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986)
(finding that an intervenor-defendant-appellant could not maintain a suit on his own for lack
of standing).
97. Hall, supra note 96, at 1542; see also Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68.
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Indeed, a large number of Rule 24 motions are made by intervening
defendants rather than plaintiffs.98 Because the original plaintiff has not
directly asserted claims against the intervenor, the court may not rely on
plaintiff’s standing to infer the defendant’s. Thus, if all intervenordefendants were required to demonstrate standing, substantial confusion
would result because the current tripartite framework is focused on plaintiff
standing.
2. Public v. Private Law Litigation
Intervention of right is a popular device used by public law99 litigants to
protect a stake in the outcome of a lawsuit.100 This is often complicated by
public law litigation’s “‘sprawling and amorphous’ party structure.”101 But
Rule 24(a)(2) itself is clearly designed with private law litigants in mind.102
Accordingly, courts have adapted the process to accommodate public law
litigation.103 Courts may scrutinize the Rule 24 interest using a different
standard for public law litigants. For example, the Tenth Circuit “follows a
very broad interpretation of the interest requirement with respect to public
law issues.”104
If the status of the interest of such public law intervenors is unclear, the
standing (especially the injury requirement) of such parties is even less
certain.105 Indeed, the concreteness and particularization requirements
often preclude public interest litigants from asserting abstract injuries.106
Moreover, the distinctness requirement prevents direct public law litigation
on issues that affect the public at large.107 Congress cannot resolve this
predicament through legislative action because it cannot confer standing on
public law litigants after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.108 However,

98. See Hall, supra note 96, at 1574.
99. This Note uses the term “public law” to refer to litigation intended to benefit the
public at large and “private law” to refer to litigation aimed at resolving a dispute between
two private parties. For a more rigorous discussion of the distinctions between public and
private law, see Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Four Senses of the Public Law-Private Law
Distinction, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (1986).
100. Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 323 (1989) (“The concept of interest is important to public interest
litigants because they represent large numbers of unorganized people, such as the poor, who
individually have interests that may appear relatively insubstantial, or they seek to vindicate
comparatively intangible interests like that of the general public in clean air.”).
101. Id. at 280 (quoting Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302 (1976)).
102. See id. at 323 n.315 (discussing how the “property” or “transaction” language of
Rule 24 is private law focused and poses a problem for public law intervenors whose
interests are often less tangible than those mentioned in Rule 24’s text).
103. See Cascade Nat. Gas Corp. v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 135 (1967)
(indicating that the interest requirement might be relaxed in situations that involve important
issues of public interest).
104. San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007).
105. See Tobias, supra note 100, at 323–26.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

2017]

RULE 24(a)(2) AND ARTICLE III STANDING

2539

Congress can provide a statutory right to intervene.109 Thus, the power of
courts and Congress to create or define an interest is substantially reduced
by an intervenor standing requirement: if standing were always required,
Congress’s and the courts’ power would be narrowed to instances in which
a potential intervenor has standing but does not have a requisite interest.
II. STANDING ORDERS: THE LOWER COURTS DIVIDE
The Supreme Court has yet to directly address whether a Rule 24(a)(2)
intervenor requires independent Article III standing. In 1986, in Diamond
v. Charles,110 the Court held that a standingless Rule 24(a)(2) intervenor
may not appeal a decision on its own.111 But the Court also conspicuously
declined to resolve whether Article III standing is initially required to
intervene.112 In 2003, the Court faced the same question in McConnell v.
FEC113 and again skirted the issue.114 Part II.A recounts the Diamond
decision, and Part II.B discusses the McConnell decision. Finally, Part II.C
discusses how the federal circuits have dealt with this issue absent the
Supreme Court’s guidance.
A. Diamond v. Charles
Eugene Diamond was a pediatrician in Illinois who intervened as a
defendant in a suit against the State of Illinois challenging the
constitutionality of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.115 The statute
imposed various restrictions on providing abortions in the state.116 After
the district court permanently enjoined enforcement of certain sections of
the law, Diamond sought to appeal the injunction.117 The State of Illinois,
however, declined to appeal.118 The Court ultimately found that Diamond
lacked independent standing to defend the statute and that his status as an
intervenor did not confer the necessary standing to maintain the litigation
on his own.119
The Court’s analysis in Diamond has resulted in conflicting inferences.
If jurisdiction were originally improper, the Court would have been fully
capable of declaring Diamond’s presence in the suit an improper exercise of

109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(1).
110. 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
111. Id. at 68; see also id. at 70–71 (“[T]he mere fact that continued adjudication would
provide a remedy for an injury that is only a byproduct of the suit itself does not mean that
the injury is cognizable under Art. III.”).
112. Id. at 68–69 (“We need not decide today whether a party seeking to intervene before
a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), but also the
requirements of Art. III.”).
113. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
114. Id. at 233.
115. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 56.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 61.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 64–68.
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jurisdiction.120 Indeed, the Court likely opted to base its decision on the
most readily available grounds for dismissal.121 Thus, Diamond only stands
for the proposition that intervenors do not automatically have standing to
appeal on their own.
B. McConnell v. FEC
The Court again had the opportunity to address this issue in
McConnell.122 Like in Diamond, intervenor-defendants sought to appeal a
circuit court decision.123 However, unlike in Diamond, the original named
defendant, the FEC, also appealed.124 This proved dispositive to the
Court’s standing inquiry: “[T]he Federal Election Commission (FEC) has
standing, and therefore we need not address the standing of the intervenordefendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC’s.”125 Although it
did not directly address the question of whether intervenors of right need
standing to intervene as a preliminary matter, the Court’s invocation of
Bowsher v. Synar126 insinuates that the Court has dispensed of the notion
that standing might be required for intervenors asserting the same claims
and requesting the same relief.127 However, although the Court appeared to
treat intervenors as similarly exempt from standing requirements as
coparties,128 the presence of the intervening party was not the issue at
dispute, only the appealability.129
Consequently, McConnell only stands for the proposition that intervenors
do not need to demonstrate standing when appealing a decision with
another party who has already demonstrated standing.
C. The Circuit Courts’ Categorical Approach
While some circuit courts have extended the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Diamond to preclude parties without Article III standing from
intervening,130 most have taken the apparent McConnell approach and
treated the Rule 24(a)(2) requirements as the only barrier to intervention.131
120. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
121. See Diamond, 476 U.S. at 64–68; see also supra notes 90–92 and accompanying
text.
122. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
123. See id.
124. See id. at 233.
125. Id.
126. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
127. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text; see also Elizabeth Zwickert
Timmermans, Has the Bowsher Doctrine Solved the Debate?: The Relationship Between
Standing and Intervention as of Right, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1411, 1449 (2009).
128. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
129. See McConnell, 540 U.S. 93.
130. See City of Chicago v. FEMA, 660 F.3d 980, 984–85 (7th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 833–34 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
131. See Laroe Estates, Inc. v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017); King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d 216, 245–46 (3d
Cir. 2014); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2011); City of
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The Second and Seventh Circuits exemplify these two approaches.132
While the Seventh Circuit requires standing to intervene,133 the Second
Circuit has held as recently as July 2016 that intervenors do not require
Article III standing.134 To compare these two methodologies, Part II.A.1
examines the Seventh Circuit’s categorical standing requirement for
intervenors of right and Part II.A.2 discusses the Second Circuit’s more lax
approach.
1. The Seventh Circuit Approach
In City of Chicago v. FEMA,135 the Seventh Circuit held that “no case
can be maintained in a federal court by a party who lacks Article III
standing.”136 The court further noted that Article III standing is insufficient
to establish a Rule 24(a)(2) interest and vice versa.137 The court justified
this stance with efficiency concerns138 and noted that “[t]he cases that
dispense with the requirement overlook the fact that even if a case is
securely within federal jurisdiction by virtue of the stakes of the existing
parties, an intervenor may be seeking relief different from that sought by
any of the original parties.”139 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit did not
address why a standing inquiry is still appropriate where the claims and
relief requested are substantially the same. Although the court noted that
other “limiting principles”140 were necessary to ascertain the scope of
intervention, it failed to delineate these principles, finding them
inapplicable to the case at hand to the extent they existed.141
2. The Second Circuit Approach
In its most recent decision on intervenor standing, Laroe Estates, Inc. v.
Town of Chester,142 the Second Circuit held that standing is not a
requirement for intervention.143 Laroe Estates sought to intervene pursuant
to Rule 24 in a takings case under the theory that it held equitable title in
the property subject to the original takings case.144 Laroe Estates’s
Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2010); Dillard v. Chilton Cty.
Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tennessee, 260 F.3d
587, 595 (6th Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 829–30 (5th Cir. 1998).
132. See, e.g., Laroe Estates, 828 F.3d 60; City of Chicago, 660 F.3d 980.
133. See City of Chicago, 660 F.3d 980.
134. See Laroe Estates, 828 F.3d 60.
135. 660 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2011).
136. Id. at 985.
137. See id. at 984–85.
138. See id. at 985 (“[S]o little is required for Article III standing that if no more were
required for intervention as a matter of right, intervention would be too easy and clutter too
many lawsuits with too many parties.”).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. 828 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017).
143. See id. at 64.
144. See Sherman v. Town of Chester, No. 12 Civ. 647(ER), 2015 WL 1473430, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2015).
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proposed complaint asserted only that it was entitled to relief for the taking
of its real property.145
The Southern District of New York denied Laroe Estates’s motion,
holding that because only an owner of property may assert a takings claim,
a claim of equitable title failed to establish the necessary legal relationship
between Laroe Estates and the Town of Chester and thus did not confer the
standing required to intervene in the takings claim.146
The Second Circuit rejected the district court’s reasoning, holding
that “‘there [is] no need to impose the standing requirement upon [a]
proposed intervenor’ where ‘[t]he existence of a case or controversy [has]
been established’ in the underlying litigation.”147 The court went on to
conclude that a party seeking to intervene will survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim so long as it does not assert any further grounds
for relief.148 However, the court failed to address the effect such a request
for further or different relief would have on the standing requirement.149
III. IF YOU DON’T STAND FOR SOMETHING,
YOU’LL FALL FOR ANYTHING
A categorical rule requiring standing does not adequately address the
practical and jurisdictional intervention problems. To highlight the
insufficiency of such an approach, Part III.A discusses why neither the
intervention nor the standing inquiries are suited to address jurisdictional
and procedural requirements, Part III.B underlines the problems with
applying an unconditional standard, and Part III.C concludes that an
intervenor’s standing is relevant only in specific circumstances because a
standing analysis is necessary only when the Case or Controversy Clause is
implicated.
A. Neither the Intervention nor the Standing Inquiry
Can Subsume the Other
Even though much of the initial confusion regarding the relationship
between standing and intervention of right stems from the varied
interpretations of the interest requirement,150 the focus on the relationship
between the standing inquiry and the intervention inquiry is a red herring.
Whereas the interest requirement of the intervention inquiry examines the
merits, a standing analysis examines “whether the interest sought to be
protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.”151 These two analyses are inherently different because they
145. See Proposed Complaint at 16, Sherman, 2015 WL 1473430 (No. 12 Civ. 647(ER)).
146. Sherman, 2015 WL 1473430, at *15–16.
147. Laroe Estates, 828 F.3d at 64 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188,
190 (2d Cir. 1978)).
148. Id. at 66 (citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972)).
149. Id.
150. See supra Part I.A.2.
151. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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examine different factors—overlap in the nuclei of facts and law should not
be confused with similarity between the standards.
Although a more consistent interest standard should be adopted for the
sake of uniformity and procedural efficiency, the interest standard actually
has no bearing on the question of whether standing is required. Regardless
of whether Article III standing is required to intervene, the lack of a
uniform interest requirement will still produce erratic results among the
circuits.152
B. The Functional Problems with a Categorical Approach
Neither categorically requiring nor disposing of the standing requirement
adequately addresses these important distinctions. Part III.B.1 emphasizes
why always requiring intervenors to independently satisfy the Article III
standing requirements is an undesirable solution, and Part III.B.2 explains
why never requiring standing goes beyond federal courts’ Article III
powers.
1. Why Stand When You Can Sit?
Requiring Article III standing for all intervenors of right presents
substantial practical and legal difficulties. Part II.C.1.a considers why this
approach is unnecessarily underinclusive, and Part II.C.1.b deals with the
conflict between requiring Article III standing and the purpose of Rule 24.
a. Requiring Standing for Rule 24(a)(2) Intervention
Is Underinclusive
Requiring Article III standing for all intervenors would exclude many
individuals from the litigation process without advancing the standing
requirement’s goals.153 For example, many circuits have more lax
standards for intervenors in public law disputes.154 Requiring standing for
all intervenors would often exclude public interest intervenors from
representing their interests in a suit, especially where they are the
beneficiary of the lax standard.155
Standing is also underinclusive in terms of judicial efficiency concerns,
particularly regarding intervenors who have an interest that is contingent
upon the outcome of the suit.156 If standing were required, such would-be
intervenors would neither be bound by the suit nor allowed to participate in
it.157 Thus, they would end up with their interest unrepresented or the court
would have another suit to entertain.

152. See supra Part I.A.2.
153. See supra Parts I.B.1, II.C.1.
154. See supra Part I.C.2.
155. See supra Part I.C.2.
156. See supra Part I.B.1.b.
157. See supra Part I.A.1; see also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 756 (1989) (“Joinder
as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method
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Categorically requiring standing also fails to serve Article III’s
jurisdictional baseline.158 Where one party has standing to assert claims in
a federal court, the court does not risk infringing on the other branches
where the intervention does not widen the scope of issues presented.159
Finally, always requiring standing does not advance the standing
requirement’s issue presentation function.160 Similar to the jurisdictional
baseline, a party with standing should be capable of adequately presenting
the issues.161 As long as the intervenor’s claims and requested relief are
identical to the original party’s, there is no risk of prejudicing other parties
not in the suit by allowing an ill-equipped representative to litigate these
claims.162
b. Requiring Standing for Rule 24(a)(2) Intervenors
Unnecessarily Limits the Function of Rule 24
One of the important functions of the intervention device is to allow a
party who has an interest that is contingent upon the outcome of the suit to
protect that interest.163 Such interests will often fail to meet the standing
injury-in-fact requirement per se because their occurrence is uncertain.164
Applying the injury-in-fact standard would greatly limit the role that
Rule 24(a)(2) plays in public law litigation.165 A lax interest requirement is
desirable from a public interest perspective because of its importance in
protecting third parties from adverse judgments without having to
relitigate.166
If standing were always required to intervene, either the court-made
interest rules regarding public and private law litigation would be
effectively overruled, or anomalous standing exceptions of questionable
constitutionality would need to be created. Especially with the continual
narrowing of standing requirements over the decades since the last
substantial Rule 24 amendment,167 imposing a standing requirement would
greatly limit its function relative to when it was last amended fifty years
ago.168

by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a
judgment or decree.”).
158. See supra Part I.B.1.a.
159. See supra Part I.B.1.a.
160. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part I.C.2.
166. See supra notes 100, 106–07 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989).
167. See supra Part I.B.2.
168. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
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2. Not Requiring Standing Is Overinclusive
Categorically permitting intervention based on an interest opens the
courthouse doors to too many would-be intervenors. Allowing all
intervenors to make new claims and direct the course of the litigation,
regardless of their constitutional standing to assert such claims, would put
an unfair burden on the original party. An intervenor should be able to
piggyback on the justiciability of the original dispute where her intervention
falls within that dispute. An intervenor should not be able to piggyback on
the original party’s standing to assert claims that it could not otherwise
bring before a federal court on its own. Intervening parties seeking
different or further relief present a separate issue than those protecting an
interest. To account for this difference, federal courts should employ a
standing analysis when they are faced with a new, discrete case or
controversy that flows from the original dispute but does not fall within the
court’s jurisdiction.
C. A Standing Analysis Is Only Necessary Where the Court
Is Faced with a Distinct Case or Controversy
Given the undesirable effects of a categorical approach, a bifurcated test
is a better approach to the issue of whether standing should be analyzed for
proposed Rule 24(a)(2) intervenors. Under a bifurcated scheme, interest
analysis should be employed to see if the proposed intervenor even has a
baseline of a protectable interest. Furthermore, courts should assess
whether a protectable interest constitutes a new case or controversy under
Article III. Standing should not be required where an intervenor simply
intervenes to protect an interest. Having a lax interest requirement,
combined with a standing requirement that is only triggered in certain
instances, addresses the overinclusive/underinclusive issues and also keeps
the process straightforward by eliminating the need to draw further
distinctions between intervenors for the standing question.169 These caseor-controversy triggers are finite and easily identified. Accordingly, Part
III.C.1 argues that intervention itself does not implicate justiciability
concerns, Part III.C.2 discusses case-or-controversy triggers where the party
with standing is no longer part of the suit, and Part III.C.3 discusses other
intervenor actions that can trigger a standing analysis.
1. Intervention Itself Does Not Require
an Independent Jurisdictional Analysis
Based on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it is clear that the
intervention device itself does not create a new case or controversy.170 If
coparties asserting the same claims and requesting the same relief are not
each required to demonstrate standing,171 intervening parties should not be
169. See supra Part I.C.
170. See supra notes 93–95, 126–29 and accompanying text.
171. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986).
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required to show independent grounds for Article III jurisdiction, because
coparties’ and intervenors’ positions are analogous. When an intervenor
makes the same claims and requests the same relief, she should not have to
show standing.172
2. Intervenors Must Demonstrate Standing When They Seek
to Continue a Suit Without the Original Party’s Participation
Where the original party that has shown standing is no longer part of the
suit because it has declined to appeal, settled, or withdrawn its claims in
another manner, a standing analysis is proper for the remaining party.
Diamond and McConnell establish that this inquiry is necessary in the
appellate context.173 Accordingly, disputes that lose the only party with
standing likewise lose justiciability until another party can meet Article
III’s standards.174
3. Discrete Claims or Requests for Separate Relief
May Trigger a Standing Analysis
If at any point during the litigation an intervenor amends her complaint to
assert different claims or request different or further relief, a standing
analysis is appropriate. Such an amendment represents a distinct case or
controversy and is therefore subject to constitutional limits on federal
jurisdiction.175 Confusion surrounds this doctrine because circuit courts
that require standing allow Rule 24(a)(2) movants to intervene on equal
footing with the original parties, whereas circuits that have a more
permissive view of intervention have less clearly defined intervenor
roles.176 The better view is that an intervenor should have equal footing
only within the confines of the established case or controversy.177
Such an approach is proper because federal courts are required to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction whenever the lack of jurisdiction
becomes apparent.178 Thus, a standing analysis should follow whenever an
intervening party amends its pleading to assert new or amended claims even
if that party originally intervened asserting the same claims as the original
party and the court, properly, did not analyze standing.
Although some authorities recognize supplemental jurisdiction as a
justification for allowing intervenors to assert counterclaims,179 jurisdiction
172. See supra Part III.B.1.
173. See supra Part II.A–B.
174. See supra Part II.A–B.
175. See supra Part I.B.
176. See supra Part I.A.3.
177. See, e.g., Gonzales v. North Township, 4 F.3d 1412, 1416 (7th Cir. 1993)
(“Although one plaintiff with standing is all that is required to vest the court with
jurisdiction, we must consider the other, dismissed, plaintiffs’ claims that they have standing.
If they do have standing, their presence in the lawsuit may affect issues of damages or
equitable relief.”).
178. See supra note 92.
179. See 7C WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 16, § 1921, at 617–18; Timmermans,
supra note 127, at 1449.
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over such claims is not proper because Congress has not created statutory
authority to do so and actually does not have the power to under Lujan.180
This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court in DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno181:
What we have never done is apply [the supplemental jurisdiction]
rationale of Gibbs to permit a federal court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim that does not itself satisfy those elements of the
Article III inquiry, such as constitutional standing, that “serv[e] to identify
those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial
process.”182

Thus, parties seeking to assert independent counterclaims, requesting
further relief, or asserting different claims should have to independently
demonstrate standing. Those advancing different theories for achieving the
same goals as the original parties should not.
CONCLUSION
Although courts and scholars put great emphasis on defining the
relationship between the Case or Controversy Clause and Rule 24(a)(2), this
emphasis is futile. Intervention requirements are triggered where a
proposed party makes a motion to intervene. The standing inquiry is
relevant where a new case or controversy is created. Although the two
doctrines may be implicated where a proposed intervenor asserts different
or further relief, they are, and should remain, separate.
Ultimately, construing intervention as a distinct case or controversy has
no basis in constitutional limits or Supreme Court jurisprudence. A
standing analysis is necessary for an intervenor where the party whose
standing she has piggybacked on is no longer part of the suit or where
claims she asserts—asserting different claims or requesting different
relief—go beyond the case or controversy on which she has piggybacked.
This approach allows an expanded group of individuals to enter a suit to
protect their rights without running afoul of Article III’s requirements or
compromising judicial effectiveness and efficiency.

180. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
181. 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
182. Id. at 351–52 (second alteration in original) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).

